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Non-state violence and political order:  
A view on long-term consequences of non-state security 
governance1 
 
Anja P. Jakobi 
 
This paper shortly reviews arguments on the involvement of non-state actors in state security. 
Research on global governance has frequently outlined the important role that non-state actors can 
play for effective global and national governance (Avant et al. 2010, Flohr et al. 2010, Reinicke 
1998, Bull et al. 2004, Josselin and Wallace 2001). But what about violent non-state actors? On the 
one hand, they seriously threaten the state monopoly of force, on the other, they might be the 
critical party to involve when helping citizens in zones of conflict, or also for establishing a political 
order against other violent groups. 
Contributions have outlined the linkage between non-state violent actors and transnational 
governance and presented possible positive and negative contributions to governance (e.g. Flohr et 
al. 2010): Non-state violence can be used to undermine security in states and of states, it can 
establish and secure illegal trade – e.g. blood diamonds –, it can use techniques as e.g. money 
laundering in order to skim off profits and use them and reinvest them in different sectors of the 
economy. However, the engagement of Geneva Call also shows, that non-state actors commit 
themselves to rules that are usually aimed at states, and that they can be more than just a cause of 
problems (e.g. Herr 2010).  
The variety of activities and contexts suggests that non-state violent actors are a very 
heterogeneous group. In this paper, I will analyze whether and how non-state violent actors are 
able to contribute to establishing or upholding a political order. In defining non-state violent 
actors, the violence concept is important: Violence can be narrowly defined as causing or 
threatening physical damage to individuals or groups. A striking example for this would be a 
robbery during which the victim is threatened with a knife. But violence can also be defined more 
broadly, involving structural violence, through an order that causes damage to individuals or 
groups without the application of direct means of violence. A historical example for this would be 
a famine, during which the death of parts of the population was tolerated or politically used. 
Incidents like this have, for example, taken place in China or the Ukraine under the Stalinist rule 
(O'Grada 2009). A narrow concept of violence is connected to a more traditional understanding of 
security, while a broader conception of security – like human security (Paris 2001) – also goes hand 
in hand with a broader conception of violence: From such perspective, the state has an obligation 
to protect not only itself, but also the population. Correspondingly, the definition of non-state 
violent actors and security problems may vary not only in empirical terms, but also analytically.  
In this paper, I apply a broader notion of violence, and link this concept to the question of how 
violent non-state actors are related to political order. Non-state violent actors, in this 
understanding, are actors that apply the use of force - in different forms - for pursuing their 
political or economic ends. Political order means establishing and enforcing regulations; effective 
governance requires enforcement to a minimum extent. The relation of political order and non-
state violent actors is crucial, since the monopoly on the use of force – i.e. the absence of non-state 
use of force – forms part of the very definition of statehood. Nevertheless, as will be explained in 
the following sections, non-state violent actors can make different contributions to the political 
order. Whether this contribution is positive or negative needs to be investigated carefully in each 
individual case. It is well possible that short term achievements may result in long term failure and 
 
 
1  A different version of this text will be published in German (Jakobi 2010). I thank Heide Rinnert for the translation, 
and Steffi Herr for helpful comments on an earlier version of this text. 
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vice versa. In any case there is a conflict for the population concerned, for the cooperation and 
trade partners and also for other countries and for diplomacy.  
In order to approach this conflict and the different forms of non-state violence in detail, the paper 
will proceed in five steps. Firstly, I will present different actors and manifestations of non-state 
violence and I will go into detail about differing functions. Secondly, an overview over the problem 
structure connected with non-state violence will be given, in particular the challenge for the 
monopoly on the use of violence, its meaning for development cooperation and for the scopes of 
limited statehood, as well as its placement regarding new security issues. Fourthly, two examples 
for the cooperation of state actors and non-state violence are given. I first present the sector of 
private military and security companies. In the past years this sector recorded a high growth rate, 
also based on demand of their services by state armies. At the same time, however, this sector is a 
commercial provider of non-state violence, which causes uncertainties regarding their control, the 
practical work and the consequences of their commitment. A further example is Afghanistan. 
There, a variety of problems and necessities arise in the cooperation with non-state violent actors – 
today and also in the past decades: currently e.g. the Taliban represent a group of non-state violent 
actors, who are able to undermine or support a political order effectively, whose means and aims, 
however, are largely incompatible with those of the Afghan government and those of other 
countries. At the same time the case of Afghanistan shows that the use of non-state violent actors 
can be part of (non-public) foreign policy, as displayed by the former US support of the mujahidin 
against the Russian occupation. There is a diverse spectrum of non-state violent actors, and as 
diverse as  the cooperation with them may be –just as unclear may be the criteria for success. In the 
fifth and final step, I give a short summary of the different forms of non-state violence, the 
cooperation with respective violent actors and the legitimacy problems in this context. 
Actors and Manifestations of Non-State Violence 
 
On the basis of a broader notion of violence, non-state violence can range from organized crime to 
armed rebel groups, including private military and security companies. Schneckener (Schneckener 
2006) presents eight ideal types of non-state violent actors and distinguishes them regarding their 
aims and use of violence: a) rebels or guerillas mainly fight in order to reach political aims, e.g. a 
different government or the secession of a part of the country; b) militias or paramilitary forces are 
armed groups outside the army, who are authorized or tolerated by a government and who are 
expected to support or enforce their aims; c) clan leaders are traditional authorities in a certain 
area, in ethnical or religious communities. They rule this part of the society, e.g. by using 
combatants or troops, and generally their aim is maintenance of this order; d) warlords are leaders 
who, in general, came into a position of power through and after violent conflicts. This position 
may later be stabilized through economic exploitation in the scope of a war economy and violent 
control of the region; e) terrorists are individual or coordinated offenders who try to destabilize 
society, economy or politics through assaults. They have political aims, sometimes related to 
religious or nationalist aims; f) criminals usually do not have political, but economic aims. They 
threaten security through activities like arms trade and human trafficking. In addition, in many 
cases politicians, officials or members of the police are corrupt, so that criminal activities are made 
possible, which in turn creates security problems; g) mercenaries or private security and military 
companies are commercial providers who offer a variety of services in connection with combat 
actions. This may include logistics, equipment or training of a national army, but it might also 
include combat actions on behalf of the government or other parties. These companies usually do 
not have political but commercial interests in conflicts; h) organized looters (also called ‘sobels’, 
derived from ‘soldier’ and ‘rebel’) are often former members of an army or a rebel group who, after 
a conflict, continue to loot civilians for their own supply. 
The organizational form of non-state violence can be very diverse. The Italian mafia or traditional 
clans have a more hierarchical structure while Al Quaida has a network structure (UNODC 2002, 
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Kahler 2009). The organizational form is quite relevant for the cooperation with non-state violent 
actors – e.g. a steady and assertive contact person is better suited for negotiations than a network 
without an identifiable hierarchy – but the organizational form alone does not give testimony 
about the role or the potential threat of a non-state violent actor. 
 
Table 1: Various functions of non-state violent actors 
 
Non-state violent actors as ... 
Cause of Problems  Advocates Addressees Agents of state 
principals 
Co-regulators  
Terrorism Armed 
opposition, 
rebel groups 
Transnational 
organized crime 
Private security 
and military 
service providers, 
militias 
Local 
administration 
through violent 
actors  
Source: own account 
 
Non-state violent actors play a variety of roles, primarily, however, they are seen as a cause of 
problems or addressees of regulations. Particularly prominent examples for this are terrorism and 
transnational organized crime. Non-state violent actors can also function as advocates if they act as 
an opposition or as a rebel group – provided they have political aims. They can also act as state 
principals, e.g. in the case of state assigned military and security service providers or tolerated 
militias. As co-regulators they can, under certain circumstances, ensure a local administration and 
the functioning of a public order (see table 1).  
Problems related to Non-State Violence  
Non-state violent actors can be conceived as problematic from different, yet interconnected 
perspectives. To begin with, a state-theoretical perspective highlights the problem of competition: 
According to the very definition of statehood, the state holds the monopoly of force regarding a 
defined population in a defined area. This monopoly means that the state is responsible for the 
enforcement of regulations, and it is an effective monopoly if the state is able to enforce the rules 
effectively. The monopoly of force is a special privilege of the state, given the fact that it restricts 
the rights of the citizens, also in democracies: E.g. compulsory schooling in Germany means a 
restriction of freedom. The same applies to compulsory military service, and a prison sentence is 
usually called a ‘deprivation of freedom’. The monopoly of force also implies that other actors may 
not define or enforce such restrictions. Students in Germany may not be restrained by their 
professor in a lecture if they wish to leave. They have to stay, however, if the police – with good 
reason – locked up the lecture hall. Also non-democracies know the monopoly of force. In China, 
convicted perpetrators can be executed – so the state uses its monopoly of force to kill. Other 
actors may not do this unpunished. On the other hand, a non-state violent act is not necessarily 
illegal, as outlined in the example of private security and military companies: Here the state 
delegates its monopoly of force to companies – to some extent with unclear consequences (cf. 
Krahmann 2010).  
Basically, non-state violent actors challenge the state monopoly of force through their activities: By 
using violence for enforcing their rules or for promoting their ideas, they can establish a space 
parallel to the established political order. Such space may not necessarily be identical with that of 
the state – yet, it does not necessarily need to be completely different. In any case, however, such 
activities create an alternative monopoly of force, and this has direct consequences for the security 
of the population, the country, but also for non-governmental organizations, trade partners or 
diplomacy. Yet, in areas of limited statehood – i.e. areas where the monopoly on violence actually 
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cannot be implemented – non-state violent actors, and less likely the state, tend to exercise the 
monopoly of force. Through these activities, actors can weaken the overall legitimacy of political 
order, but they can also provide public goods, e.g. human security (Schneckener 2006).  
Non-state violent actors are also an important issue for development cooperation (Grävingholdt et 
al. 2007): Through the extended agenda of ‘Human Security’, development work has a special role 
in the organization of post-conflict states. Target groups have to be reached, local staff has to be 
recruited and supported, and maybe, the promotion of norms – like human rights – or conflict 
transformation are in the responsibility of the organization. At the same time, a number of violent 
actors can be found in the areas where these aims are pursued. Their cooperation or at least their 
tolerance is often necessary for development projects. Simultaneously, development cooperation 
needs the support of the state, which may result in being placed in-between various parties. 
Grävingholt et al. present various practical propositions for such context, e.g. the strict 
consideration of the conflict context, a clear aim-orientation and the careful adjustments with the 
other actors, for example foreign policy of the state active in development policy (Grävingholdt et 
al. 2007: 4-5). The relation to non-state actors may then adopt distinct forms, between disregard 
and cooperation. Each of these strategies has advantages and disadvantages and they need to be 
adapted to the specific circumstances. 
Generally, the problems that arise in the context of non-state violence are closely linked to overall 
changes in security policy: Instead of combat actions between states – the classical wars –, 
intrastate violence and thus non-state violence become more significant in security studies (Kaldor 
2007). Besides, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the disarmament and re-fitting of the former 
Eastern block armies made many and low-priced weapons available to groups who formerly had 
no access to them. As a consequence, non-state violent actors today can be equipped quite easily 
and cheaply (cf. Singer 2008). Moreover, by using asymmetrical strategies and networking, 
especially in the case of terrorism, violent actors are not local phenomena, but they can act across 
different countries. Finally, the amplification of the security concept towards Human Security also 
implies an extended definition of security threats. This brings new actors to the limelight, like 
transnational organized crime (e.g. UNODC 2004, for the US: Clinton 1995, Raine and Cilluffo 
1994). 
Private military and security companies in zones of conflict 
 
Security policy has not only undergone a dramatic change through the broadening to ‚Human 
Security’, but also through the organizational change of producing ‘classical’ security. For example, 
state armies are subject to internationalization tendencies, and technological changes made new 
kinds of military strategy and training possible and necessary (Mayer 2009, Helmig and Schörnig 
2007). An important trend is privatization in the military sector, which is linked to a more general 
turn towards a liberal ‘New Public Management’ in public sectors. In the security sector, an 
increased assignment of private companies had been a major transformation (see e.g. Deitelhoff 
2009, Deitelhoff and Geis 2009). This move was primarily designed to reduce costs, because private 
competitors – it was assumed – would provide services at a lower price than non-competing state 
agencies. At the same time, the state would limit its activities to the core functions, delegating as 
many tasks as possible to private actors: A common example for such ‘outsourcing’ are public 
hospitals with an external catering company supplying food. This trend to outsourcing has also 
reached the military (Avant 2005). Subcontracting work to external companies may concern 
logistics, e.g. food supply and laundry service, transportation of material and troops, or weapons 
training. It is also possible to hire whole back-up forces, including equipment, to be paid on a daily 
basis. Whether and how far such providers are used in state armies differs across countries. The US 
Army is heavily relying on such providers (Deitelhoff 2007): There, private companies work in the 
logistics sector, but also in weapons training, and even in combat actions. A prominent, quite 
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inglorious example for such a cooperation was presented by Blackwater during the deployment of 
the US Army in Iraq (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2007).  
Such outsourcing can only be conducted, if providers exist that are able to satisfy the demands of 
the public sector effectively. In fact, since the 1990s an extensive and growing market developed 
around private military and security companies (Singer 2008). An important reason for this 
process is the large number of former members of the military and an easy supply with equipment. 
After the end of the Cold War, countries reduced their mass armies, and many former members of 
the armies had to switch to new labor markets. At the same time, the availability of equipment 
made it possible to easily join trained military groups and to use them for a variety of purposes. In 
former zones of conflict, like South Africa, former members of the military allied after signing a 
peace agreement and offered their services for money. Today, security and military companies 
systematically recruit former high-ranking members of armies – especially of the US army – and 
through this strategy, they guarantee a high level of training and expertise to their customers 
(Singer 2008, Deitelhoff 2007: 176-177). Singer offers a typology of companies oriented, regarding 
their distance, to the combat actions (‚Tip of Spear Typology’, Singer 2008: 92-3): 
 Companies that offer troops or weapons systems are usually also involved in combat actions. 
Companies that offer consulting are not directly involved in combat actions, but in their planning, 
in their strategy development and analysis. Companies that offer logistics support, stay in the 
background in combat actions. From this distance they relocate troops or equipment, provide 
supply services etc. All services that are not linked to direct combat actions, are also of interest to 
armies that are not active in conflicts but wish to outsource specific tasks – e.g. meals, laundry etc. 
The references made so far about outsourcing, the US Army and the Iraq War might suggest that 
private security and military service providers are only a phenomenon of the Western 
industrialized world. This is not the case: These companies even cause particular difficulties in 
zones of conflict or in environments of limited statehood, which is closely linked to their role as 
state agents or co-regulators there. This shall be illustrated using the examples of Angola and Sierra 
Leone and above all of the company Executive Outcomes (EO) (see Singer 2008:101-110):  
EO used to be a private security company from South Africa, which started offering security 
packages for companies, later also including combat actions as a service. Members of EO were 
former members of elite units of the South African army. After the end of the apartheid regime, 
they found themselves laid off and applied their expertise in the private market of security. EO 
became an example for a particularly influential and financially very profitable security company, 
especially due to their activities in Angola and Sierra Leone. The company also provides an 
example of how even stronger states have difficulties in coping with these actors: After a change in 
the law of South Africa, which was above all destined to limit the company in its expansion and 
activities, EO was officially closed. Nonetheless, it seems that the owners and employees continue 
their work in different places and under different names.  
The lack of transparency surrounding the sector makes it difficult to exactly trace the development 
of firms: name changes, company liquidations, restructuring and re-foundations are frequent, and 
impede a clear assignment of activities as well as legal liability. A prominent example is provided 
by Blackwater, a firm that made it to newspaper headlines in 2007 due to violent and lethal 
activities in Iraq. As a consequence of those events, the US government did not extend the contract 
after 2009. As a consequence, Blackwater ceased to exist in that way: The company was 
restructured and renamed in ‘Xe’, which enables them to try out for contracts with the US 
Government again. A contract awarded to them in 2010 on the training of the Afghan police had 
to be put out for tender again only because of an appeal through one of the competitors 
(Washington Post 2010). This demonstrates, on the one hand, problems regarding an effective 
sanctioning of a rapidly transforming contractual partner, and, on the other, a certain dependence 
of contract awarding partners who consider these services important, but cannot provide them 
themselves. Thus, the rise of private security and military service providers as co-regulators can 
lead to a situation, in which an ‘unloved partner’ is involved in a common task and even the 
contract awarding partner has difficulties in changing this. 
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On the other hand these companies also represent important strategic partners for states, as 
revealed in the case of Angola. Angola is a country with a constantly low economic development 
and a low Human Development Index, but it is rich in natural resources. Since the end of the 
Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the country has been suffering from a civil war. War parties were 
at first the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola), collaborating with the Soviet 
Union, which later formed the government, and the UNITA (National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola), originally supported by South Africa and the US. With the end of the 
East-West conflict, the Angolan government and their army lost external support, and the UNITA 
succeeded in gaining important territories. When in 1993 they brought an oil production facility 
under their control, the situation became precarious for the government, because it threatened to 
eliminate the governmental revenue of licensed oil business. In order to regain control over the 
facilities and the territories, the Angolan government used combat forces of EO. Those – in part 
former fellow combatants of UNITA during their time in the South African army – liberated the 
facility very quickly and efficiently. 
These activities caused great attention and found opponents: The Angolan army was afraid of 
competition, the South African army called the behavior of former members disloyal, and UNITA 
now had an additional strong opponent. After the operation the Angolan government, however, 
signed a long-term contract, assigning EO to train the army and to assist them in fighting. The 
training in new strategies and the support in combat actions led to a nearly total defeat of UNITA 
– a development that a few months before had seemed quite unlikely. As a result, the weakened 
group signed a peace treaty. But this treaty and a subsequent UN mission did not yet succeed in 
establishing peace. Instead, the position of the Angolan government was significantly stronger than 
that of UNITA, which eventually lead, after further conflicts, to the disbanding of the group  (see 
Singer 2008:101-110). As an agent of a state principal – the government – the security and military 
service provider effectively enforced the government’s interests in a civil war. This does not 
necessarily imply legitimacy, also because the Angolan government itself is still in a process of 
democratization (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2008): President Dos Santos has been governing for several 
decades. 
Due to their business interests, the service providers act for the benefit of their contracting 
customers. Yet, this also implies that loyalty to the customers is not necessarily expanding to the 
time after the end of the contract. The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates this spectacularly (Singer 
2008:110-115): Sierra Leone is also a country with many natural resources, but for a long time 
suffered from a kleptocratic government and a civil war. Its own army was continuously weakened, 
for that it would not become a threat for the ruling powers. In 1991 combatants of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by the Liberian dictator Charles Taylor, intruded 
the country over the common border. The RUF combatants quickly and brutally managed to get a 
large part of the country under their control, while the army of Sierra Leone could not offer much 
resistance due to inferior training, size and equipment. A first attempt of the government to hire a 
security and military service provider failed, when the latter cancelled the contract after casualties 
occurred. In 1995 when RUF started to take Freetown, while the UN, the US and UK had already 
rejected to support the government, a comprehensive contract was concluded with EO. The 
contract was partly to be paid by the government through granting concessions for diamond mines 
– in an area that at that time was still occupied by RUF. With a new strategy, a helicopter operation 
and without being immediately recognized, EO managed to force RUF to retreat within a few days 
further and more quickly than it was the case in Angola. After that EO trained parts of the army as 
well as independent combatants, the ’Kamajors’, in order to cooperate with them. 
After RUF retreated from the capital and the surrounding areas, EO transferred its activities to the 
minefields, for which they had been granted concessions. There, RUF was also defeated and 
pushed back to the border. After negotiations took place, elections were held in 1996, and 
peacefully replaced a general who had meanwhile come to power through a coup. EO had not 
supported the coup but cooperated with the general and later also with his elected successor – 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. When the prospect of a UN mission was held out and international 
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criticism was expressed regarding the assignment of EO, the new president ended the cooperation. 
Instead of an international UN mission, troops of the East African Regional Organization under 
Nigerian leadership were sent, who were supposed to guarantee security in the country. EO also 
had intelligence service information available and informed the new president of Angola, that 
within 100 days, his security staff and RUF would organize a coup d’état. At the same time they 
transmitted an offer for a new assignment, which was destined to guarantee the security of the 
government. This offer was not accepted, but in 1997 (on the 95th day of the 100-day deadline) the 
government was overthrown by RUF and parts of the army, the population in the capital was 
looted and in large numbers shot, with the foreign peace troops being unable to protect the 
population. 
Some time later, the overthrown president hired Sandline, a competitor of EO. Sandline helped to 
bring the former government again into power and also trained Kamajor and the international 
strike forces. In 1998 RUF was driven out of the capital again, and later the reconstruction of the 
army and the support through foreign troops helped to disband RUF. In 2002 elections were held 
again. In the meantime, diplomatic difficulties became evident, arising from the fact that Sandline 
had completely ignored the existing arms embargos in its operations – which happened, according 
to Sandline, with the knowledge of the British government. The latter objected to this publicly, but, 
later had to admit that is was true. Altogether, the lacking public security after the retreat of EO in 
Sierra Leone cost the lives of about 10.000 civilians (Singer 2008:110-115). 
The examples illustrate that private security and military service providers are able to effectively act 
as co-regulators of security – if they receive an assignment. The case of Sierra Leone, however, also 
shows that countries, if they are not able to offer security as a public good, can quickly become 
dependent. This can be true for zones of conflict and non-democratic public areas, where people 
might be threatened by a further instable, and maybe changing, security situation. As long as a 
state has a monopoly of violence, private security and military service providers can act as co-
regulators. If an effective monopoly does not exist, it seems more appropriate to conceive them as 
the only administrators, which would correspond to the function of an agent of the state principal. 
These examples also illustrate that in such cases security depends on financial means, and that it 
can be directly connected with the financial interests of the companies, if the payment agreed upon 
is constituted by the economic use of areas to be liberated. In that case security is not an abstract 
public good in a political order, but a specific private service supplied by a contractor. In the case 
of Sierra Leone EO was no longer interested in the security situation in the country after the 
contract ended. 
The success of private security and military service providers is likely to remain high in the near 
future, since they provide different services for a large number of countries and specific advantages 
for governments: Beside the fact that they seem to make redundant building up own capacities, 
they are, especially for democratic countries, a means to avoid transparency in a military 
operation: In contrast to soldiers, casualties in the private companies are not officially counted but 
upon conclusion of the contract they are permanently externalized. Another problematic aspect is 
the fact that it is unclear to what extent human rights or international humanitarian law are 
binding parts of the service: In contrast to a state army, the private service providers are not that 
clearly sworn to commitments, also regarding human rights of civilians or the opposing army, nor 
even to the contracting entity. Private providers can actually neither be required to commit 
themselves to constitutional law and the law of the state armies, nor to the duties that soldiers have 
(e.g. the strict interdiction to desert). Depending on the individual case, the cooperation with these 
actors can cause just as many problems as it is trying to solve. Therefore, the rise of private security 
and military service providers as co-agents and co-regulators needs to be regarded very carefully 
also in the future. 
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Non-state violence and a weak state: Afghanistan  
In Afghanistan today, private security and military companies are involved in the conflict and 
work together with ISAF. In addition, there is a number of important other non-state violent 
actors which play an important role in the provision of security. The functions of non-state 
violence are very complex in this country, and a certain necessity for cooperation with violent 
actors becomes evident –and problematic consequences as well. At first I will give a short 
introduction to the history of Afghanistan, and then, on the basis of two different points of time, I 
will explicitly highlight the role of non-state violent actors and their cooperation with states. 
The history of Afghanistan is on the one hand characterized by internal conflicts of different rulers, 
small or large groups and religiously motivated actors, but, on the other hand, is also strongly 
influenced by the strategies and power claims of other countries (Schetter 2007a, Maley 2009). 
Reasons for internal conflicts are e.g. the culturally rooted autonomy of different groups regarding 
the state, the hierarchy of different ethnical groups that was formerly supported by the state, the 
economic and cultural differences between cities and countryside or the religious denominations. 
Only for a very short period of time different rulers or governments managed to bring stability to 
the country, and in rare cases their influence reached a wide scope of the country. At the same 
time, Afghanistan was also an important strategic element for a number of colonial powers since 
the 19th century, above all for Britain and for Russia. Even the borders of Afghanistan were 
determined by those big powers after 1884 and the area was expected to form a buffer between 
Russia and British India. Borders were drawn around a territory that did not form a unity and the 
ethnic groups were assigned to different states. 
The drawing of the border did not resolve internal conflicts and the rulers in Afghanistan changed 
frequently. During the Cold War, the country maintained good relations with both the USSR and 
the US and constituted an important potential partner for both powers. In the course of the years, 
however, the situation in Afghanistan became more unstable and in 1978 a new ruler - Nur 
Muhammad Taraki - overthrew the government in a putsch in Kabul, and subsequently tough 
action was taken against any opposition. In 1979 Taraki was killed and his successor Hafizullah 
Amin came into power and his politics fomented the conflicts in the country again. The US cut 
their development aid after the death of their ambassador who was killed in a hostage-taking and 
liberation action at the beginning of 1979. In the course of the same year, Moscow disassociated 
itself more and more from Amin. When the latter faced increased domestic difficulties and 
initiated a turn-about in his politics by intensifying the relationship to Pakistan, to Islamists and 
also to the US, the USSR occupied Afghanistan in December 1979.  
The occupation lasted until 1989 and was characterized by many casualties for the USSR, who 
never managed to really get the country under control. Especially the mujahidin, a group of 
Afghans who favored a strict interpretation of Islam, offered resistance. They were, however, 
heavily struck through Soviet attacks from the air, particularly through helicopters. The US, 
however, started to support the mujahidin, especially through Stinger Missiles (a so-called 
MANPADS, Man-Portable Air Defense System). This cooperation led to extensive casualties for 
the USSR and made clear that there was no chance to win the war. At the same time the situation 
in Afghanistan remained unstable, so that the ruler installed by the Soviet Union, Nazibullah, was 
likely to be overthrown soon. This happened in 1992 and was succeeded by even more power 
struggles, this time between different groups of the mujahidin. At that time a new group emerged, 
the Taliban. Starting in 1993 they conquered parts of Afghanistan and reached the capital in 1996, 
and until 2001 they kept almost the whole country under their control, except for an area in the 
north. 
This shows that the non-state violent actors played a key role in the history of Afghanistan – 
regarding stabilization but also destabilization of the country. To start with, a monopoly on the use 
of force cannot be presupposed, and instead, different groups each establish their own monopoly 
on violence. In some moments, non-state actors had become co-regulators: During the Russian 
occupation, other states like the US and Pakistan intended to ‘co-administrate’ the political order 
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in Afghanistan with the aid of non-state violent actors, through this avoiding the establishment of 
an effective monopoly of force by the Russian occupiers. This demonstrates a very strategic 
cooperation with non-state violent actors, and it could be described as transnational governance in 
a state of war.  
Over the course of time, the example of Afghanistan also shows the huge ambiguity of a 
cooperation with non-state violent actors: Parallel to the Russian occupiers and the Taliban, there 
is a development of different local structures of power and violence that compete with state power 
– which is only present and can only be achieved in the big cities (Schetter 2007b). At the same 
time, especially drug trafficking provides many local rulers with a great deal of money and constant 
financial earnings. At the beginning the ISAF Afghanistan mission, supported by the ‘Northern 
Alliance’ – a group that resisted the Taliban in the north – managed to force the Taliban to retreat. 
But besides other problems, it soon became obvious that the Afghan state does not per se hold a 
monopoly of force. In order to overcome at least partly the opposition through the population, the 
Afghan government and the allies plan to negotiate with moderate Taliban groups (FAZ 2009). 
This seems especially important against the background of a possible withdrawal of ISAF, in order 
to avoid more and continuing fighting of individual groups for the rule in Afghanistan. Other than 
in the case of the private and military security companies, this is an attempt to use non-state 
violent actors as co-regulators to establish a common and binding political order. It remains to be 
seen whether this strategy will be successful in the long run, in particular given the different idea 
on what the Afghan society should look like.  
The assessment of long-term consequences constitutes a particularly important problem related to 
cooperation with non-state violent actors. From the view of the US and parts of the occupied 
Afghan population, it was strategically useful to support the mujahidin against the Russians, but 
they also supported – or at least did not avoid – the emergence of a power vacuum after the 
Russians’ retreat and finally the rise of the Taliban. In addition non-state violence as an alternative 
to the state was further institutionalized, and aside from that the actors were – in this case – even 
armed. In the subsequent years this fact provided another problem: Not all the weapons (in this 
case mainly man-portable air-defense systems, MANPADS) supplied to the mujahidin were used, 
many of them were stored in stockpiles. In the 1990s, the US launched a wide-ranging repurchase 
campaign which failed, however, because the weapons were not returned. It is also assumed that 
there is a lively commerce with those easy to handle ground-to-air missiles, which also represent a 
danger for civil aviation: There were various terrorist attacks or attempts of such attacks (Stohl et 
al. 2007:86-96). Today ISAF and the Afghan government are also unsure about the long-term 
consequences: Without integrating non-state violent actors, state building will remain difficult, 
and with them it might be possible to find compromises on regulations that are not sustainable or 
that are – e.g. from a human rights perspective – not desirable. 
Summary and outlook 
This paper briefly presented the role of non-state violent actors as co-regulators or in other 
functions. Non-state violent actors display a wide spectrum, reaching from rebels to terrorists and 
criminal organizations. As a consequence there is a variety of functions that they can fulfill. On the 
basis of two examples – private security and military service providers and the history of the 
conflict in Afghanistan – I illustrated the role and the problems of non-state violence. The lacking 
monopoly of force that comes along with the use of non-state violent actors, seems to be 
particularly problematic: The security of the population cannot be guaranteed, and the 
development of state capacities linked to security provision might be severely affected. 
The example of private security and military companies showed that the intervention in wars may 
be successful in the sense that areas can be brought under control again, but this does not 
necessarily show sustainable effects: The retreat of these actors can create a situation, in which 
non-state violence escalates through other actors. The example of Afghanistan shows that non-
state violence can be effective to a much wider extent than the state monopoly of force, and that 
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violent non-state actors might be the only regulators – with problematic consequences. However, 
some non-state violent groups may constitute a better representation of the population than the 
actual government, and may even lead to a better human security of specific parts of the 
population. As the example of the Sudan shows (see Herr 2010), violent groups may well provide 
public goods that the government does not provide. In such cases, the difference between non-state 
violent groups and the state is difficult, and might be very different from the cases discussed above. 
In any case, non-state violent actors – in spite of their evident differences – are still very special 
actors and their contribution as co-regulators carries many risks. The question about the 
legitimacy of the cooperation or the involvement with non-state violent actors remains significant 
and crucial. Grävingholt et al. hold a relativist point of view, according to which engagement with 
a violent actor depends on the adherence to other guidelines and also on the context in which the 
actor operates: ’if a government systematically violates human rights, and, by doing so, itself helps 
to exacerbate conflict, closer forms of engagement of external actors with an NSAG [non-state 
armed group] acting in this context seem more legitimate than when the government’s conduct is 
generally acceptable in this respect’ (Grävingholdt et al. 2007:4). While this provides an approach 
for development organizations, it remains vague whether state violence can integrate non-state 
violence in the long run, in order to come to certain results of the regulation. The long-term 
consequences of an involvement with non-state violent actors can differ very much from the 
original aims, as the examples provided above show: In the countries mentioned above, it is 
precisely the use and distribution of non-state violence that led to the fact that a state violence does 
not yet exist. But, from a perspective of human security, it could be very useful to continue 
working towards that aim. 
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